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This article examines diversity on corporate boards, focusing on gender 
diversity and taking both contemporary and historical perspectives. 
Australia forms a particular focus of the article but, as far as mandatory 
quota legislation is concerned, other jurisdictions provide comparisons. The 
authors illustrate how Australian corporate board gender diversity is 
starting from a low base in contrast to some other types of boards. 
Arguments for and against more women on boards are analysed in order to 
provide a comprehensive examination of extant research. The article also 
examines briefly whether a business case can be made for board gender 
diversity within the wider framework of board diversity. The authors 
acknowledge that there are unanswered questions about the right gender 
balance on boards and whether, without mandatory quota legislation, a 
voluntary system can achieve best practice targets. They explore the notion 
of critical mass — the idea that, upon female board representation reaching 
approximately 15 per cent, efforts to further redress the imbalance may lose 
momentum. Their conclusion is that, in the Australian jurisdiction, progress 
is being made belatedly towards increasing gender diversity on corporate 
boards. However, substantial challenges are envisaged if significant 
progress is not made imminently to increase the number of women serving 
on corporate boards.  
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This article asks whether diversity of corporate board membership is desirable 
and how that diversity can best be achieved. While recognising that diversity 
is broader than gender diversity, this article focuses on gender debates, 
providing a framework for analysis of a topical issue. The authors take the 
view that board gender diversity represents both governance and community 
expectations but that change is progressing slowly in Australia. Hence, 
arguments are presented both for and against board gender diversity, 
presenting the state of play, while also disclosing the authors’ position that 
board gender diversity brings greater heterogeneity to boards which aids 
decision-making. The authors set the article within the Australian context but 
provide international comparisons and a historical framework. While the 
focus is on corporate board gender diversity, the authors provide examples 
from other domains, such as the not-for-profit, university and government 
sectors. Their conclusion is that while, in the Australian jurisdiction, progress 
is being made on board gender diversity, there is still a long way to go. In a 
voluntary system such as Australia’s increases in diversity have occurred 
belatedly, recently and from a low base. This article is timely given the 
release of the Women on Boards’ Guidelines for Gender Balance 
Performance and Reporting Australia1 which outline five key points on how 
all types of organisations can improve career opportunities for women that 
will lead to more women being available for board positions. The Guidelines 
provide a framework that encourages cultural change in public and private 
entities. While adoption of the Guidelines is voluntary, it is envisaged that 
they will be used for corporate governance reporting to shareholders in annual 
reports. In brief, the Guidelines recommend collecting and reporting data on 
women in the workplace and their training and development for leadership 
positions.2 While it might be argued that no new insights on gender diversity 
on boards are provided by the Guidelines, they underscore the urgency of the 
issue in today’s world. 
                                                 
1 Stephanie Quine, Gender Balance Guidelines Launched (3 May 2013) Lawyers Weekly 
<http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/gender-balance-guidelines-launched>. See also 
Women on Boards Guidelines Development Committee, Guidelines for Gender Balance 
Performance and Reporting Australia (May 2013) <http://womenonboards.org.au/pubs/ 
guidelines/>. The Guidelines Development Committee was formed with the initiative of 
Women on Boards and includes Chartered Secretaries Australia, Financial Services Institute 
of Australia, Stockland, UGM Consulting, Women’s Lawyers Association of Queensland Inc, 
and Women on Boards. 
2 Women on Boards Guideline Development Committee, above n 1. 
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II DIVERSITY DEFINED 
Social diversity is the result of the interaction of the numerous human 
attributes differentiating individuals and groups. Castania suggests that 
[i]mplicit in this definition [of diversity] is the awareness of our group 
identities as well as our individual differences. We are unique as 
individuals, while our group identities determine our historical inclusion or 
exclusion. We often see ourselves only as individuals, even though 
historically we have been treated based on our group identities.3 
Similarly, ‘diversity’ at board level encompasses a number of human 
attributes, of which gender is but one. The United States Department of 
Agriculture Strategic Planning Task Force on Diversity provides the following 
definition: ‘[D]iversity is differences among people with respect to age, class, 
ethnicity, gender, physical and mental ability, race, sexual orientation, 
spiritual practice, and other human attributes.’4 Nonetheless, the board 
diversity debate is dominated by gender — both in Australia and abroad.5  
III ARGUMENTS AGAINST BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY 
Arguments against board gender diversity are outlined briefly below, while 
noting that they are susceptible to several counter-arguments:  
A The Reverse Causation Argument 
It is argued that strong corporate performance leads to increased board 
diversity, rather than diverse boards achieving improved corporate 
                                                 
3 Kathy Castania, Diversity: What is Diversity? (Cornell University, 1996) 2 
<http://extension.usu.edu/diversity/files/uploads/diversity704.pdf>.  
4 Strategic Planning Task Force on Diversity — Cooperative State Research, Education, and 
Extension Service, Pathway to Diversity: Strategic Plan for the Cooperative Extension 
System's Emphasis on Diversity (Washington, DC, October 1991), cited in Castania, above 
n 3, 2. 
5 See, eg, Jo Armstrong and Sylvia Walby, European Parliament, Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies — Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Gender 
Quotas in Management Boards (2012) 4 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
committees/en/JURI/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=66951>; Vanessa 
Anastasopoulos, David A H Brown and Debra L Brown, Women On Boards: Not Just the 
Right Thing … But the ‘Bright’ Thing (May 2002) The Conference Board of Canada, 3 
<http://www.conferenceboard.ca/e-library/abstract.aspx?did=374>. 
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performance: this occurrence is referred to as ‘reverse causation’.6 Whilst the 
application of reverse causation is specific to gender diversity, the extension 
of the noted arguments to other elements of diversity is not unreasonable. 
Studies have revealed that successful corporations tend to appoint more 
female directors and several studies have addressed this notion directly. An 
example is Farrell and Hersch,7 who studied a sample of between 266 and 300 
Fortune 500 and Service 500 firms between 1990 and 1999. Their study 
revealed that firms achieving strong profit results or return on assets 
appointed more female directors.8 Adams and Ferreira concluded that, 
‘[a]lthough a positive relation between gender diversity in the boardroom and 
firm performance is often cited in the popular press, it is not robust to any of 
our methods of addressing the endogeneity of gender diversity’.9 Dobbin and 
Jung’s later research supported the finding of Adams and Ferreira ‘that the 
cross-sectional positive relationship found between board diversity and 
corporate performance is likely spurious — a consequence of reverse 
causation’.10 
B The Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc Fallacy 
‘After this, therefore because of this’ is a fallacy of reasoning that correlation 
proves causation.11 All other things being equal, a result following an action 
(with identified correlation) is insufficient to prove that the result is caused by 
the action (causation). Unless all other variables can be identified and 
controlled, it may be unreasonable to conclude that a corporation’s improved 
performance has been achieved as a result of recruiting a more diverse board. 
Because of the innumerable variables impacting upon the performance of 
corporations, concluding that a diverse board improves corporate performance 
is hence difficult. 
                                                 
6 Frank Dobbin and Jiwook Jung, ‘Corporate Board Gender Diversity and Stock Performance: 
The Competence Gap or Institutional Investor Bias?’ (2011) 89 North Carolina Law Review 
809, 819. 
7 Kathleen Farrell and Philip Hersch, ‘Additions to Corporate Boards: The Effect of Gender’ 
(2005) 11 Journal of Corporate Finance 85, 90. 
8 Ibid 86.  
9 Renee Adams and Daniel Ferreira, ‘Women in the Boardroom and their Impact on 
Governance and Performance’ (2009) 94 Journal of Financial Economics 308, 308 quoted in 
Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 820.  
10 Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 820. 
11 US Legal Definitions, Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc Law and Legal Definition (2012) US 
Legal <http://definitions.uslegal.com/p/post-hoc-ergo-propter-hoc/>. 
2014 DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS 5 
 
 
Similarly, the sibling maxim cum hoc ergo propter hoc, meaning ‘with this, 
therefore because of this’, is also a fallacy of reasoning: two things occurring 
together do not necessarily have a cause-and-effect relationship.12 This 
argument has also been applied to board diversity to assert that improved 
profits may not be caused by an increase in female directorships.13 
C Tokenism 
‘Tokenism’ refers to situations where the interests of minority groups are 
promoted for political reasons rather than diversity being embraced as an 
opportunity, with all talent sources being considered with a view to recruiting 
the most effective mix of qualified individuals. In cases of ‘token 
representation’, minority group representatives ‘face expectations that make it 
difficult to perform to their potential’ and ‘face pressures that may adversely 
affect their performance’, such as additional scrutiny from majority members 
and the perception that their position is one of representation and not one 
based upon individual merit.14 
D Stereotype–threat 
Research suggests that ‘experimental manipulation’ to increase the 
prominence of minority group representation may have negative repercussions 
on the performance of minority members (and in turn the board and the 
corporation).15 Based on the fact that more diverse views need to be taken into 
consideration it becomes harder to develop strategy and to make board 
                                                 
12 David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (Harper 
& Row, 1970) 167–9. See further Crystal A Gadegbeku and Glenn M Chertow, ‘Cum Hoc 
Ergo Propter Hoc: Health Disparities Real and Imagined’ (2009) 4(2) Clinical Journal of the 
American Society of Nephrology 251 <http://cjasn.asnjournals.org/content/4/2/251.full>; John 
Aldrich, ‘Correlations Genuine and Spurious in Pearson and Yule’ (1995) 10(4) Journal of 
Statistical Science 364, 364–76 <http://www.economics.soton.ac.uk/staff/aldrich/spurious. 
pdf>. 
13 Siri Terjesen, Ruth Sealy and Val Singh, ‘Women on Corporate Boards: A Review and 
Research Agenda’ (2009) 17 Corporate Governance: An International Review 320, 334.  
14 Barbara F Reskin, Debra B McBrier and Julie A Kmec, ‘The Determinants and 
Consequences of Workplace Sex and Race Composition’ (1999) 25 Annual Review of 
Sociology 335, 347–9; see also Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation 
(Basic Books, 1977) 210–12, referred to in Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 816. 
15 Claude M Steele and Joshua Aronson, ‘Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test 
Performance of African Americans’ (1995) 69(5) Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 797, 798–9, cited in Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 817. 
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decisions. The influence of experimental manipulation and stereotypes makes 
minority group representatives feel they are being judged as a group rather 
than as individuals, thus reducing performance.16  
E Problem-Solving Efficacy 
Some scholars contend that ‘[m]ixed gender and racial groups may divide, 
and diversity may elicit group conflict that interferes with efficacy. Diversity 
in race, ethnicity, and, to a lesser extent, sex, tends to bring about group 
conflict, hinder communication, and interfere with cooperation, thereby 
lowering performance’.17 Research analysing the impact of diverse boards on 
corporate performance — via the diminished interaction and problem-solving 
of a diverse group — is largely divided as studies have produced inconclusive 
and inconsistent results.18  
F Research Evidence that Performance Is Unrelated 
to Diversity 
Adams and Ferreira and Dobbin and Jung rebuff conclusions made on the 
basis of previous studies indicating a causal link between gender diversity and 
performance. They state that those studies ‘cannot be “given causal 
interpretations” because they did not account for endogeneity — inclusion of 
which likely would have resulted in a negative effect’.19 Farrell and Hersch’s 
study of between 266 and 300 Fortune 500 and Service 500 firms over 10 
years from 1990 to 1999 revealed ‘reverse causation’ and the appointment of 
female directors by companies experiencing a successful period.20 Farrell and 
Hersch concluded that, following their appointment, ‘female directors do not 
affect [the corporation’s] subsequent performance’.21 Adams and Ferreira 
went even further than this, noting that, after appointment, ‘female directors 
have subsequent negative effects’.22 Dobbin and Jung conceded that ‘[t]he 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 See generally Katherine Y Williams and Charles A O’Reilly III, ‘Demography and Diversity 
in Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Reasearch’ (1998) 20 Research in Organizational 
Behaviour 77, cited in Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 816. 
18 Terjesen, Sealy and Singh, above n 13, 324. 
19 Adams and Ferreira, above n 9, 292, 306, cited in Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 810, 817. 
20 Farrell and Hersch, above n 7, 85, cited in Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 819. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Adams and Ferreira, above n 9, 308, cited in Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 819–20. 
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negative effects found in certain studies may be real’, and hypothesised ‘a 
new mechanism to explain this effect: shareholder bias’.23 
G Dobbin and Jung’s ‘Institutional Bias’ Theory for 
Male Board Domination 
Dobbin and Jung’s 2011 theory of ‘institutional investor bias’ (or shareholder 
bias) suggests that corporations may suffer share price reductions as a result 
of taking progressive action on gender diversity.24 In this view, sharemarket 
performance is equated to corporate performance. Dobbin and Jung 
hypothesised that the control wielded by institutional investors, as major 
players in equities markets, directly affected company share prices and that 
gender bias drove some of their strategic decisions.25 Institutional investors 
held 80 per cent of the shares in the largest companies of Dobbin and Jung’s 
sample,26 which reflected American shareholding at the time.27 Their research 
considered, among several hypotheses, the impact of board gender 
composition on the buy and sell decisions of institutional investors.28 As 
active traders, institutional investors develop buy and sell strategies, with 
concern for matters such as in changes in board composition.29 Dobbin and 
Jung cited survey results concluding that investors generally believe that 
‘women lack the human capital and business experience to be board 
members’, hypothesizing that ‘investors may react negatively to firms that 
appoint women board members’.30 They discovered that ‘institutional 
investors do promote gender diversity on boards through shareholder 
proposals favoring diversity’.31 Their findings noted that increases in board 
                                                 
23 Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 820. 
24 Ibid 811, 820. 
25 Ibid 820–5. 
26 Ibid 825–6. 
27 Ibid 836. 
28 Ibid 822. 
29 See Michael Useem, Investor Capitalism: How Money Managers Are Changing the Face of 
Corporate America (Basic Books, 1996) 209; Diane Del Guercio and Jennifer Hawkins, ‘The 
Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism’ (1999) 52 Journal of Financial Economics 
293; Stuart L Gillan and Laura T Sparks, ‘Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder 
Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors’ (2000) 57 Journal of Financial Economics 275, 
284; Sunil Wahal, ‘Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance’ (1996) 31 Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1, 9, cited in Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 817. 
30 Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 822. 
31 Ibid 828. 
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gender diversity do not affect subsequent profitability. However, critically, 
Dobbin and Jung’s study revealed that, despite stable profits, ‘an increase in 
gender diversity on boards is followed by a significant decrease in stock 
value’.32 This observation lends credence to the hypothesis that ‘institutional 
investors may sell the stock of firms that appoint women to their boards not 
because profits suffer, but because they are biased against women’.33 
IV ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF BOARD GENDER 
DIVERSITY 
Some arguments in favour of board gender diversity are outlined briefly 
below.  
A Board Gender Diversity Leads to Better Corporate 
Performance 
It is argued that, by considering all sources of talent in the recruitment of 
board directors, progressive corporations with enlightened approaches to 
diversity achieve improved performance.34 The Institute of Directors in 
Ireland believes that the need for gender diversity is 
just one element of a broader need for diversity in the boardroom which is 
of paramount importance to the leadership and success of a business and its 
interests. Diversity should not just be about ensuring the presence of female 
                                                 
32 Ibid (emphasis added). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC), Diversity on Boards of Directors 
Report (March 2009) 51 <http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac. nsf/byHeadline/ 
PDFFinal+Reports+2009/$file/Board_Diversity_B5.pdf>; Lois Joy et al, The Bottom Line: 
Corporate Performance and Women’s Representation on Boards (2007) Catalyst, 1 
<http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/bottom-line-corporate-performance-and-womens-
representation-boards>. See also David A Carter et al, ‘The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of 
US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance’ (2010) 18(5) Corporate 
Governance An International Review 396, 410–11; Niclas L Erhardt, James D Werbel and 
Charles B Shrader, ‘Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance’ (2003) 
11(2) Corporate Governance: An International Review 102, 107, cited in Dobbin and Jung, 
above n 6, 809. Deloitte, Board Effectiveness Corporate Australia: Bridging the Gender 
Divide (2010) 3 <http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Tanzania/Local%20Assets/ 
Documents/Deloitte%20Article_Women%20in%20the%20boardroom.pdf>; Forbes Insights, 
Diversity and Inclusion: Unlocking Global Potential: Global Diversity Rankings by Country, 
Sector and Occupation (2012) <http://www.forbes.com/forbesinsights/diversity_2012/>.  
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directors, it encompasses much more than that, everything from the skills 
and expertise of directors to their level of independence from the company, 
to their age and nationality.35 
Numerous studies have linked diverse boards with improved share prices and 
profitability, with the majority of research focusing upon the dominant board 
diversity issue: gender.36 In 2007, Catalyst, ‘a leading non-profit organization 
with a mission to expand opportunities for women and business’,37 performed 
a detailed research study which considered the impact of gender diversity on 
company boards. It was noted that companies with ‘more female board 
representatives’ outperformed those with ‘the least’ female board 
representatives on each of the following key financial indicators: return on 
equity (by 53 per cent), return on sales (by 42 per cent), and return on 
invested capital (by 66 per cent).38  
Theoretically, a board representing diverse societal interests achieves 
improved levels of strategic thinking and risk management. This view is 
supported in the literature. In a 2002 study, the Conference Board of Canada 
pointed out the advantages of a diverse board, which included representatives 
of diverse company owners and stakeholders.39 It stated that such a board 
makes better strategic decisions as it is better equipped to rely on diverse 
views to manage risk and improve strategic planning.40 Maura Quinn of the 
Institute of Directors in Ireland is also supportive of board diversity, noting 
that critical questions are asked by a diverse board and that ‘diversity brings a 
range of perspectives to discussions, helping to avoid the group-think 
mentality which has been seen in some boards in recent years’.41 In Deloitte’s 
2010 document, Board Effectiveness: Corporate Australia: Bridging the 
Gender Divide, Liselott Kilaas, in the foreword, acknowledges the ‘evolving 
role of the corporate board’ and the significant increase in the ‘scope of the 
                                                 
35 Maura Quinn, Submission in Respect of Consultation on Gender Imbalance in Corporate 
Boards in the EU (25 May 2012) Institute of Directors in Ireland, 2 <http://ec.europa. 
eu/justice/newsroom/gender-equality/opinion/files/120528/all/188_en.pdf>. 
36 See, eg, Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 809.  
37 Catalyst is an organisation ‘dedicated to creating more inclusive workplaces where 
employees representing every dimension of diversity can thrive’: Catalyst, Who We Are 
(2013) <http://www.catalyst.org/who-we-are>. 
38 Joy et al, above n 34. 
39 See Anastasopoulos, Brown and Brown, above n 5; Quinn, above n 35. See also Deloitte, 
above n 34. 
40 Anastasopoulos, Brown and Brown, above n 5, 3. 
41 Quinn, above n 35, 5. 
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board’s oversight’ in calling for ‘a broader skillset and wider perspective in 
the board. Again, there is an implied need for more board diversity’.42 
B Board Gender Diversity Affects Problem-Solving, 
Teamwork and Decision-Making 
Many extend the argument, proposing that a diverse board affects problem-
solving efficacy,43 leading to improved corporate performance.44 Research 
suggests that groups with occupational diversity are more effective at 
problem-solving than those without diversity (homogeneous groups).45 
Furthermore, personality diversity amongst teams improves efficacy by 
broadening discussions, thus avoiding group-think. In addition, studies found 
that team work is improved when at critical mass (which is generally 
considered to be 15 per cent or more)46 and another study has found that 
having three or more women on a board can change the dynamics and lead to 
improved performance.47 Whilst conceding that correlation does not prove 
causation, Thomson and Lloyd conclude that ‘[i]t seems fair to say that 
insofar as the business case for appointing more women to boards is provable, 
it is proven’.48 Despite these arguments, and whilst research is not conclusive, 
                                                 
42 Deloitte, above n 34.  
43 Karen A Bantel and Susan E Jackson, ‘Top Management and Innovations in Banking: Does 
the Composition of the Top Team Make a Difference?’ (1989) 10 Strategic Management 
Journal 107, 111, 114, 118, cited in Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 814. See also Donald C 
Hambrick, Theresa Seung Cho and Ming-Jer Chen, ‘The Influence of Top Management Team 
Heterogeneity on Firms’ Competitive Moves’ (1996) 41(4) Administrative Science Quarterly 
659, 680. 
44 Joy et al, above n 34. See also Carter et al, above n 34, 410–11; Erhardt et al, above n 34, in 
Dobbin and Jung above n 6, 809–10. See generally CAMAC, above n 34; Deloitte, above 
n 34; Forbes Insights, above n 34. 
45 Bantel and Jackson, above n 43, 107, 111, 114, 118, cited in Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 
814. 
46 Joy et al, above n 34.  
47 Alison M Konrad, Vicki Kramer and Sumru Erkut, ‘Critical Mass: The Impact of Three or 
More Women on Corporate Boards’ (2008) 37 Organizational Dynamics 145, 145 ff; Jeremy 
Galbreath, ‘Are There Gender-Related Influences on Corporate Sustainability? A Study of 
Women on Boards of Directors’ (211) 17 Journal of Management & Organization 17, 18, 25.  
48 P Thomson and T Lloyd, ‘Women and the New Business Leadership’ (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011), quoted in Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 34. 
2014 DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS 11 
 
 
evidence indicative of a correlation between board gender diversity, problem-
solving, team work, and decision-making has been identified.49 
C Causal Link between Female Leadership and 
Corporate Performance 
Studies have suggested a correlation between female leadership and corporate 
performance.50 
[T]he Forbes 2010 ‘World’s 100 Most Powerful Women’ issue, [conducted] 
a study of the stock performance of the 26 publicly traded companies run by 
women on the list [and] discovered that, as a group, they outperformed the 
market, where most companies were run by male CEOs. On average, the 26 
companies beat the market by 28% and their respective industries by 15%.51 
Despite such conclusions being open to counter-arguments, Forbes’ 
conclusions are supported by many business leaders. An example is Jane 
Diplock who, in the foreword to Deloitte’s Women in the Boardroom: A 
Global Perspective, stated that ‘business should see that this issue [gender 
diversity] is no longer about equal opportunity, or even merely a matter of 
choice. It is clearly a matter of good governance’.52 Liselott Kilaas, in the 
same foreword, noted that ‘[m]ore women should sit on boards because of the 
evolving role of the corporate board … [and] … because board diversity is 
required more than ever’.53 Elizabeth Broderick stated in a speech that ‘[t]he 
research correlates increased corporate performance with greater gender 
diversity at the senior level. Companies with better gender diversity at the 
senior levels, do better’.54 Women like Elizabeth Broderick, in leadership 
positions in peak bodies, have acted as change agents, providing a voice for 
women seeking to obtain board positions while recognising the danger that 
                                                 
49 Yi Wang and Bob Clift, ‘Is There a “Business Case” for Board Diversity?’ (2009) 21 Pacific 
Accounting Review 88, 89–91; Jean J du Plessis, Ingo Saenger and Richard Foster, ‘Board 
Diversity or Gender Diversity? Perspectives from Europe, Australia and South Africa’ (2012) 
17 Deakin Law Review 207, 242–3. 
50 See above n 34. 
51 Forbes Insights, above n 34, 4, 8. 
52 Deloitte, above n 34, 2. 
53 Ibid 3. 
54 Elizabeth Broderick, ‘Getting on Board: Quotas and Gender Equality’ (Speech delivered at 
‘Gender Matters’, the third Women on Boards Conference, Sheraton on the Park, Sydney, 29 
April 2011) <http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about/media/speeches/sex_discrim/2011/20110429_ 
women_boards.html>. 
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such reform may stall. As noted by Broderick in April 2011, ‘[a] window of 
opportunity to achieve critical mass has opened over the last 18 months’ as a 
result of Australia’s rapid improvement in female board representatives on 
listed companies.55 Given the rate of progress, Broderick predicted that 
‘[o]ver the next 12 months we will most likely progress to around 15% of 
women on ASX [Australian Securities Exchange] 200 boards’.56 Indeed, 
during 2012, Australia reached 15 per cent female representation on ASX 200 
boards and, as at 28 May 2014, the rate was 18.2 per cent.57 Upon the rate of 
female representation reaching levels of around 15 per cent there exists the 
risk that ‘the pace of change will slow and the pressure for change will 
reduce’.58 Broderick pointed out that this was the experience of the United 
States (US) where the number of women on the boards of Fortune 500 
companies has remained at 15 per cent for over a decade and she argued that 
we should not allow this to happen in Australia.59 Indeed, business leaders 
increasingly support the notion that for a nation to achieve global success it 
must utilise and develop its female talent.60 The European Commissioner, 
Michel Barnier, states that ‘it’s not only a question of fairness. The presence 
of women in the leadership of a country or a region or a business is a question 
of good governance’.61  
D Corporate Boards should Reflect Different Diversity 
Paradigms 
Some scholars argue that corporate boards should reflect the composition of 
the community and its demographic make-up for three reasons: to avoid 
discrimination; for fairness, equity and access; and for the promotion of 
learning and effectiveness.62 Fairness and the avoidance of discrimination are 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD), Statistics: Appointments to S&P/ASX 200 
Boards <http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Governance-and-
Director-Issues/Board-Diversity/Statistics>. As at July 2014, these were the latest statistics 
available, which are updated on a quarterly basis. 
58 Broderick, above n 54. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Forbes Insights, above n 34, 8. 
61 Deloitte, above n 34, 15. 
62 Robin J Ely and David A Thomas, ‘Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity 
Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes’ (2001) 46(2) Administrative Science 
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the dominant paradigms for understanding diversity, focusing the lens on 
equal opportunity, fair treatment, fair recruitment, and compliance with 
legislation.63 The access and legitimacy paradigm reflects the need to accept 
and celebrate difference, matching the demographics of the corporation to 
those of the community.64 The learning and effectiveness paradigm links 
primary tasks to markets, products, strategies, missions, business practices 
and cultures, enriching decision-making in governance.65 Considering the fact 
that 50.2 per cent of Australia’s population is female,66 but, on 28 May 2014, 
women accounted for only 18.2 per cent of directorships among Australia’s 
top 200 listed companies,67 each of these arguments has some currency and 
they are convincing. 
V WHAT IS THE RIGHT GENDER BALANCE? 
Evidence suggests that it is theoretically possible to achieve the ‘right gender 
balance’ on a corporate board. Those who present such evidence argue that 
the ‘right gender balance’ is denoted by a minimum 40 per cent representation 
of each sex, which can be achieved by either voluntary or mandatory means.68 
Various reference points are relevant when considering optimum corporate 
board gender balance. Examples of relevant statistical benchmarks include: 
the percentage of women in the population, the percentage of women in the 
labour force, or the percentage of women on government boards (in aggregate 
and/or on each board — see Table 1 in the Appendix to this article for 
strategies that have been used on government boards). Alternatively, arbitrary 
percentages, which clearly indicate a move towards absolute equality, may 
also be argued to provide the ‘right gender balance’. Thus, although one can 
speculate on what the ‘right’ gender balance is, it is impossible to determine 
                                                                                                                    
Quarterly 229; David A Thomas and Robin J Ely, ‘Making Differences Matter: A New 
Paradigm for Managing Diversity’ (1996) 74(5) Harvard Business Review 79. 
63 Ely and Thomas, ‘Cultural Diversity’, above n 62, 245–6. 
64 Ibid 231, 243–4. 
65 Ibid 231 ff. 
66 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 3235.0 — Population by Age and Sex, Regions of 
Australia, 2011 (30 August 2013) <http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Products/ 
3235.0~2012~Main+Features~Main+Features?OpenDocument>.  
67 AICD, above n 57. 
68 Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 4. 
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this with precision but the aspiration, worldwide, is to have between 30 and 
50 per cent of a particular gender on boards of at least listed companies.  
VI QUOTA LEGISLATION 
The concept of quota legislation refers to legislated change that sets a target 
for the gender percentage on corporate boards to be achieved within a certain 
timeframe. Governments in several international jurisdictions have elected to 
phase in gender quotas over different timeframes, passing laws for this 
purpose; they have adopted variable approaches to sanctions and compliance 
requirements for companies of differing legal status. However, the approach 
of these governments has shown little variation concerning gender equality 
targets for quota legislation (nor has there been substantial variation among 
the targets of nations pursuing voluntary mechanisms). An international 
consensus has established that a minimum of 40 per cent of each gender 
holding directorships on a board represents best practice, as illustrated by 
some international jurisdictions (discussed below) which have adopted quotas.  
A Norway First out of the Blocks 
The first corporate board gender quota law in the world was introduced by 
Norway, through amendments to the Norwegian Public Limited Liability 
Companies Act.69 In February 2012, it remained ‘the only example of fully 
implemented legislation (in the sense that the date for meeting the target has 
passed)’.70 Norway’s model was successful due to the strictness of sanctions 
supporting its legislation. The ultimate sanction for a company not achieving 
the mandatory gender quotas is the dissolution or deregistering of the 
company.71 
                                                 
69 Aagoth Storvik and Mari Teigen, Women on Board: The Norwegian Experience (June 2010) 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 3 <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07309.pdf>, cited in 
Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 6. In 2003, Norway’s Companies Act was amended, to 
include the gender quota requirements for company boards under, specifically, sub-s 6-11a: 
Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, translated by Schjødt to reflect all 
amendments up to 20 June 2014 <http://www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/ 
Regulations/Acts>.  
70 Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 6. 
71 Ibid 6, 14, 31; Deloitte, above n 34, 21. 
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The Norwegian legislation demanded that, for ‘larger boards, 40% of the 
members were to be of each gender; a more detailed specification was made 
for smaller boards (if two or three members, then there should be one of each 
gender; if four or five members, at least two of each; if six-eight at least three 
of each; if nine or more then 40%)’.72 Companies had five years until January 
2008 to implement targets. 
There remains no room for non-compliance in Norway, and the sanctions 
ensured rapid results.73 Norway first mandated gender quotas for publicly 
listed companies by demanding a minimum of 40 per cent female directorship 
by 2008.74 Public limited companies had until 1 January 2008 to meet the 
requirements and they were indeed met. Thus, although, as pointed out above, 
the final consequence for non-compliance was the dissolving of the company, 
no public limited company has been dissolved on account of the gender rules 
to date.75 
Norwegian legislation demanded its companies increase female board 
representation from 7 per cent76 to 40 per cent in only five years — a 472 per 
cent increment on the base level.77 This required Norwegian companies to 
double their starting rate in the first year (2004) and then continue that same 
rate consistently for a period of five years (for example, 7 per cent in 2003, to 
14 per cent in 2004, 21 per cent in 2005, 28 per cent in 2006, 35 per cent in 
2007, and 40 per cent in 2008). Corporate board female representation rose 
from only 6 per cent in 2002 (prior to the passing of the quota law) ‘to 9% in 
2004, 12% in 2005, 18% in 2006, 25% in 2007, 36% in 2008, reaching 40% 
in 2009’.78 However, implementation took 10 years, ‘from the first 
government motion until the final implementation of the quota’,79 which was 
                                                 
72 Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 6, 14, 31. 
73 Jamie Atkinson, ‘Gendered Organizations and Women’s Career Progression in the Financial 
Services Sector’ (2011) 33(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 243, 248, cited in 
Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 10. 
74 See above n 69. See also Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 4. 
75 Deloitte, above n 34, 21. 
76 Arni Hole, Norwegian Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, ‘Diversity 
Deployed, the Norwegian Experiences’ (Speech delivered to the second Diversity on Boards 
Forum, Sydney, 2–3 September 2009) 2. 
77 The 472 per cent increase [([40%-7%]/7%)*100] required an effective doubling of Norway’s 
female board representation year-on-year to achieve the quota requirements by 2008. 
78 Storvik and Teigen, above n 69, 12. 
79 Ibid 5.  
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considered too long by many and recommended to be avoided by nations 
seeking to emulate Norway.80 
The fact that the 500 largest Norwegian company boards had averaged 7 per 
cent female representation in 2003 caused political embarrassment.81 
Australia reported comparable statistics;82 yet a decade later Norway has 
almost three times the percentage of women on boards that Australia has: 
Australian boards have 13.8 per cent female directors, compared to 36.3 per 
cent in Norway (as at the end of 2011, reflected in figures released in March 
2012).83 
The achievement of the Norwegian objective encouraged other countries to 
implement similar quota legislation.84 
B Impact of Norwegian Legislation on Other 
Jurisdictions 
Norway’s success inspired several nations to follow its lead.85 Countries that 
have implemented quota legislation86 include France, Belgium, Italy and 
                                                 
80 Ibid 12.  
81 Hole, above n 76, 2. 
82 Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, ‘Representation of Both Sexes on 
Company Boards’ in Broderick, above n 54. 
83 GMI Ratings, ‘GMI Ratings’ 2012 Women on Boards Report Shows Women Hold More 
than One in Ten Board Seats Globally’ (Press Release, 8 March 2012) 
<http://www3.gmiratings.com/home/2012/03/gmi-ratings%E2%80%99-2012-women-on-
boards-report-shows-women-hold-more-than-one-in-ten-board-seats-globally/>.  
84 Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 30. 
85 Forbes Insights, above n 34, 27.  
86 Thirteen countries have recently enacted laws for the introduction of gender equity quotas for 
corporate boards, including: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands: see Lord Davies, Women on 
Boards (Report, UK Government Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2011) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31480/11-
745-women-on-boards.pdf>. See also European Commission’s Network to Promote Women 
in Decision-Making in Politics and the Economy, ‘The Quota-Instrument: Different 
Approaches Across Europe’ (Working Paper, June 2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/files/quota-working_paper_en.pdf>; Rohini Pande and Deanna Ford, ‘Gender Quotas 
and Female Leadership’ (Background Paper, World Development Report on Gender, 7 April 
2011) World Bank <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/Resources/ 
7778105-1299699968583/7786210-1322671773271/Pande-Gender-Quotas-April-2011.pdf>; 
Mirella Visser, ‘Advancing Gender Equality in Economic Decision-Making’ (Background 
2014 DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS 17 
 
 
Spain, but the specific gender quotas and the sanctions if not achieved vary 
for all these countries.87 France passed a quota law in January 201188 
requiring that ‘40 per cent of executive board members of the largest publicly-
traded companies (quoted on the stock exchange, or those with more than 500 
employees, with a turnover exceeding €50 million over the previous three 
years)’ be female, with a deadline of 2016.89 French law has a transitional 
period with two phases (20 per cent by 2013 and 40 per cent by 2016) with 
penalties including ‘annulment of board appointments’.90 
A Belgian quota law91 was implemented via a new article inserted into the 
Belgian Company Code, requiring a minimum of one-third female and one-
third male directors on publicly traded and state-owned company boards, 
effective from ‘the first fiscal year following the publication of the law’.92 The 
law was published on 14 September 2011 after being approved on 28 July 
2011 and penalties for non-compliance include the ‘[t]emporary loss of 
financial and non-financial benefits by board members’.93 
                                                                                                                    
Note presented at European Conference on Equality between Women and Men, Brussels, 19–
20 September 2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/conference_sept_2011/ 
background-paper-decision-making_en.pdf>; Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 6.  
87 See also Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 30–1. 
88 Timothy Hindle, ‘Help Wanted: Women for Europe’s Boards’ (2011) Briefings on Talent 
and Leadership Magazine in Deloitte, above n 34, 15.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 30. 
91 ‘The Belgian law of 28 July 2011 on the reform of certain government-held companies, the 
Belgian Company Code and the National Lottery, aims to guarantee a representation of 
women on the boards of autonomous government-held companies, publicly-listed companies, 
and the National Lottery’: Myriam Van Varenbergh, ‘Women in Economic Decision Making’ 
(Comments Paper, Exchange of Good Practices on Gender Equality, European Commission 
(Justice), 10–11 May 2012) 2 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/exchange 
_of_good_practice_no/be_comments_paper_no_2012_en.pdf >. 
92 Deloitte, above n 34, 16. A new article was inserted into the Belgian Companies Code via art 
518 bis. The quota requires that, for public and state-owned companies, at least one-third of 
directors ‘should be of a different gender to the other members of the board of directors’: 
Mathilde van der Stegen, Towards a Feminization of the Board of Directors: The Introduction 
of a Gender Quota for Belgian State-Owned and Publicly-Traded Companies (27 March 
2013) Association of Corporate Counsel <http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=67a644f5-6bba-4033-a24d-62774df63e30>. 
93 Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 30. 
18 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 19 NO 1 
 
 
On 28 June 2011, Italy implemented quota Law no 120/2011.94 The changes 
were implemented in July–August 2011.95 The law requires that the lowest 
represented gender on the Boards of Directors and Audit Committees should 
originally be increased to one-fifth for the first three years after the provisions 
became law and to at least one-third after that three-year period. Italy’s 
Gender Parity Law applies to ‘public limited companies and state-owned 
companies’ and demands ‘at least 33% of each gender on their boards 
(executives and non-executives) by 2015 (with a target of 20% for the 
transitional period)’.96 The consequences of non-compliance are severe: 
companies will receive a warning, with four months grace to rectify the 
matter. If they fail to achieve quotas the company is fined between €100 000 
and €1 million and its audit committee is fined between €20 000 and 
€100 000, with a further three months to rectify the situation.97 Continued 
failure to comply results in removal of the board and audit committee.98 
Spain introduced its gender quota law in 2007 by passing the Constitutional 
Act 3/2007 of 22 March for Effective Equality between Women and Men, 
referred to as the ‘Equality Law’ (or La Ley de Igualdad).99 According to 
Article 75 of the Equality Law, ‘[c]ompanies obliged to present unabridged 
financial statements of income will endeavor to include a sufficient number of 
women on their boards of directors to reach a balanced presence of women 
and men within eight years of the entry into effect of this act’. The law defines 
‘a balanced presence’ as a minimum of 40 percent of each gender and not 
exceeding 60 per cent of any gender. This provides further support for the 
                                                 
94 ‘On June 28, 2011 the Italian Parliament approved Law no 120/2011, a legislative enactment 
introducing affirmative action for women (significantly called, in Italian, “quote rosa”, ie, 
“pink quotas”) in companies:’ Palomar–Osservatorio di dirrito constituzionale, The Italian 
Parliament Approves a Law Introducing an Affirmative Action to Promote Women’s 
Representation in Companies (Law no 120/2011) (October 2011) 
<http://www3.unisi.it/dipec/palomar/italy016_2011.html>. 
95 Deloitte, above n 34, 19. 
96 European Commission, ‘National Factsheet: Gender Balance in Boards’ (January 2013) 1 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/womenonboards/womenonboards-factsheet-
it_en.pdf>. 
97 Deloitte, above n 34, 19. 
98 Ibid. See also European Commission, above n 96, 1. 
99 Constitutional Act 3/2007 of 22 March for Effective Equality between Women and Men (22 
March 2007) Coordinadora Española Para el Lobby Europeo de Mujeres (‘Equality Law’) 
<http://www.celem.org/pdfs/Ley_Igualdad_Ing.pdf>. See further Nuria Chinchilla and 
Victoria Kraunsoe, Progressive Law in Spain Not Enough (5 September 2013) 20 First 
<http://www.20-first.com/737-0-spanish-quota-does-not-take-hold.html>.  
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general, international consensus of the right gender balance.100 Companies 
have until 2015 to comply.101 Spanish quota law differs from most others in 
that no penalties apply for non-compliance. The government has disclosed, 
however, that it will ‘take compliance into consideration in the awarding of 
certain public contracts’.102 It will be interesting to track the statistical 
progress of board gender-diversity in Spain based on this incentive and in the 
absence of legal sanctions. 
The Malaysian government, in 2004, published strong recommendations for 
the appointment of a minimum 30 per cent women at ‘decision-making levels’ 
for its public and corporate sectors.103 Following a slow response in the 
corporate sector, Malaysia announced a Cabinet-approved gender equity 
quota on 27 June 2011 and gave companies five years to comply.104 The 
Prime Minister stated that ‘[t]his decision reflects that the government today 
is not only supportive towards women’s roles and success, but is also 
encouraging them to further move ahead in their career’.105 Furthermore, to 
ensure the success of the quota, the Malaysian Finance Ministry, the 
Malaysian Alliance of Corporate Directors, and the Malaysian Directors 
Academy ‘formulate training programmes to prepare those with potential for 
the board of directors’ job’.106  
It should be noted that although it has been widely reported that Malaysia has 
legislated a quota system, it remains a recommendation only and forms part of 
the revised Code of Corporate Governance, which took effect in 2012.107 
Without the backing of legal enforcement, the recommendations have 
achieved only mixed results.108  
                                                 
100 Susan Vinnicombe, Women on Corporate Boards of Directors: International Research and 
Practice (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008) 101. 
101 Deloitte, above n 34, 22. 
102 Ibid. 
103 S Abdullah, Ku Nor Izah Ku Ismail and Lilach Nachum, ‘Women on Boards of Malaysian 
Firms: Impact on Market and Accounting Performance’ (10 September 2012) Social Science 
Research Network, 8 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2145007>. 
104 Deloitte, above n 34, 11. 
105 Mazwin Nik Anis, ‘PM: 30% of Corporate Decision-Makers Must be Women’, The Star 
Online (online), 27 June 2011 <http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/6/27/nation 
/20110627131533&sec=nation>. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Abdullah, Ismail and Nachum, above n 103. 
108 Ibid. 
20 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 19 NO 1 
 
 
Over the next decade, inadequacies with voluntary mechanisms may lead 
other nations to follow suit and implement legislated quotas.109 Nations 
electing to pass quota legislation which differs from the strict sanction-based 
system of Norway may experience a fluctuation in board gender diversity 
statistics110 because of the scope given for non-compliance.  
C Evaluating Mandatory Quotas to Achieve Gender 
Diversity 
1 Advantages 
Advocates of legislation, in espousing the virtues of quotas, cite research 
correlating board-level gender diversity and corporate performance. The 
gender gap has been described as ‘both an injustice and a drag on company 
economic performance’.111 Quotas have been proven to remedy the issue 
quickly, with Norway one of the countries providing evidence of this.112 
Goldman Sachs posited that increasing female participation rates would lift 
Australian GDP by 11 per cent;113 if female productivity and participation 
were both raised to levels equivalent to those of males, GDP would increase 
by 20 per cent114 Based on this, quota legislation should be considered as an 
option to ensure that the economic advantage of having more females on 
boards could be reaped sooner than what would be the case if voluntary 
targets are achieved through a self-regulatory corporate governance model. To 
mandate minimum levels of female directorship would cast the net wider than 
is currently the case, leading to better use of talent and an increase in female 
productivity and participation. Quotas would remedy the current inequity and 
injustice of gender imbalance — in principle. If the research correlating 
gender diversity with corporate performance is relied upon, then the 
advantages of a legislated quota system in Australia could be substantial. The 
                                                 
109 Forbes Insights, above n 34, 4, 27. 
110 Ibid 4. 
111 Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 5. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Broderick, above n 54. See further Goldman Sachs, Australia’s Hidden Resource: The 
Economic Case for Increasing Female Participation (26 November 2009) 
<http://www.asx.com.au/documents/about/gsjbw_economic_case_for_increasing_female_par
ticipation.pdf>, cited in Deloitte, above n 34, 2. 
114 Broderick, above n 54. 
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promotion of board gender equity would further economic equality between 
the sexes. According to Forbes in its 2012 Global Diversity Rankings study: 
It’s worth noting that greater economic equality between men and women 
has been shown to reduce poverty rates, boost GDP and lead to better 
governance. In order to improve female participation rates, governments 
can adopt a number of proven approaches such as flexi-time initiatives, free 
or subsidized childcare, and tax breaks for married couples when both 
partners work.115  
Quotas arguably circumvent the compounded effect of the stereotypes that 
men ‘listen to men’,116 mentor younger males by preference,117 and ‘promote 
people like themselves’.118 
2 Disadvantages 
Several commentators believe that quotas forced Norwegian companies to 
‘window-dress’ board appointments in order to meet strict legislation,119 
devaluing female directorships by removing the opportunity for women to be 
promoted without doubt being cast on their merit.120 
Whilst Norway achieved 40 per cent female directorship by 2009, at the same 
time a survey of the ‘largest Norwegian companies’ revealed that ‘less than 1 
per cent of the CEOs [were] women, while the average presence of women in 
the corporate management groups in these companies [was] 10 per cent’.121 
                                                 
115 Forbes Insights, above n 34, 8. 
116 Domini Stuart, Feature: The Gender Imbalance (1 June 2010) AICD 
<http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Publications/Company-
Director-magazine/2010-back-editions/June-2010/June/Feature-The-gender-imbalance>. 
117 The Economist, ‘Women in the Boardroom: The Wrong Way to Promote Women’ (21 July 
2011) <http://www.economist.com/node/18988506>. 
118 Ibid. 
119 The Economist, ‘Women in Business: Still Lonely at the Top’ (21 July 2011) 
<http://www.economist.com/node/18988694>. 
120 Gael O’Brien, Women in the Boardroom: Should the US Have Quotas? (3 August 2011) 
Business Ethics <http://business-ethics.com/2011/08/03/women-in-the-boardroon-should-the-
us-have-quotas/>. 
121 Vibeke Heidenreich, ‘Kjønn og makt i norsk næringsliv’ in K Niskanen and A Nyberg (eds), 
(2009) 59 Kön og makt i Norden, del I, Landsrapporter TemaNord, cited in Mari Teigen, 
Exchange of Good Practices on Gender Equality (May 2012) European Commission 
(Justice), 10 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/exchange_of_good_practice_ 
no/no_discussion_paper_no_2012_en.pdf>.  
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Chairpersonship remains male-dominated122 and a recent study of ‘prime 
insiders’ on the Oslo stock exchange — completed by Burson-Marsteller — 
indicates that women account for only 27% of a wider group of prime insiders 
and only 8% of ‘the most trusted’ prime insiders within Norway’s top 
companies.123 Based upon 2010 data — one year after achieving the mandated 
40 per cent female directorship target — companies on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange had female CEO representation of only 2 per cent.124 Such statistics 
bring into question the depth of commitment to gender diversity in countries 
with mandated quota law. 
Many companies and commentators oppose legislated gender quotas as they 
force the appointment of individuals without the necessary qualifications, 
experience and preparedness, rather than appointments being made on 
merit.125 Such appointments are considered a threat to corporate governance 
structures and performance. Significant research, adjusted for reverse-
causation, indicates that gender diversity negatively affects corporate 
performance.126 As will be seen below, some also believe that the market 
should judge corporate governance practices; legislation dilutes the effect of 
that prerogative. 
VII VOLUNTARY REGIME IN AUSTRALIA 
Unlike a quota system, a voluntary regime allows corporations and their 
boards to set their own targets for gender diversity on corporate boards, as 
                                                 
122 Storvik and Teigen, above n 69, 3. 
123 ‘Most trusted’ positions were indicated by Burson-Marsteller as ‘Chairmen, CEOs and 
CFOs’: Burson Marsteller, InnsideBorsen Q1 2012 (22 January 2012) 2 <http://burson-
marsteller.no/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/InnsideBørsen-Q1-2012.pdf>, cited in Teigen, 
above n 121, 10. Inaki Longarela and Lene Foss, The Norwegian Paradox: A Literature 
Review (University Business School, University of Tromsø, 2011) 3. 
124 Storvik and Teigen, above n 69, 3. 
125 Rapidly increasing the rate of female appointments requires a substantial increase in first-
time directorships, which arguably may cause a risk to the corporate governance of 
companies. In 2010, 55 per cent of female director appointments to ASX 200 boards were 
first-time ASX 200 directors; see Broderick, above n 54. The merit principle ‘aims to ensure 
that leadership selection processes are fair, impartial and transparent. It means the outcome 
isn’t based on where you went to university, or who you know, or what your parents do. The 
merit principle is intended to eliminate favouritism, nepotism and bias – and … sexism’: 
C Burton, ‘Merit, Gender and Corporate Governance’ in Linda Hancock (ed), Women, Public 
Policy and the State (Macmillan Education, 1999), cited in Broderick, above n 54. 
126 See above Part III. 
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long as reasons are provided for non-compliance with the national guidelines 
introduced by the ASX in 2003. This can be done in companies’ own 
timeframes, with minimal government interference, enabling corporate boards 
to retain discretion in directorship recruitment, and avoid compliance costs 
and penalties whilst committing to a culture of gender equity by choice. 
The approach taken in Australia is set against the background of the diversity 
debate discussed above. Within the broader societal context of equality and 
participation, some have observed that the increase in the appointment of 
women to corporate boards has occurred slowly, starting at the beginning of 
the women’s movement in 1970 and being promoted by changes in the social, 
economic, political, and competitive environments (see Table 1 in the 
Appendix). The table illustrates that change occurred in two contexts (defined 
as the outer context of the social, economic, political and competitive 
environments and the inner context entailing the structure, corporate culture 
and political environment within the community). The table shows that the 
development of board diversity is not a simple linear process, but that actions, 
reactions and interactions of stakeholders occur in an interlocking manner 
over time. It is a combination of events at a variety of levels interacting over 
time as the change process is given legitimacy by people in power on boards 
who respond to the idea of mentoring and developing mentor and develop 
women for board positions. 
Table 1 illustrates how the development of board diversity has occurred in 
three phases. Phase 1 focused on equal rights for women and girls, with little 
movement of women onto boards. Phase 1 was revolutionary and radical, with 
high levels of activity on the streets, in the media, and through publications 
such as books and journal articles. Phases 2 and 3 were evolutionary. Phase 2 
focused on positive actions for women in the workplace, with an emphasis on 
management rather than governance, but with some women obtaining board 
positions. The focus was on ‘education and equality’ for women and girls — 
equal opportunities for women in society, such as the removal of explicit 
barriers to the admission and progression of women in the workforce. Phase 3 
focused on women seeking power and influence through diversity 
mainstreaming and through gender access to the boardroom. Each of these 
periods of change was associated with the election of federal Labor 
governments.  
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A The 2009 CAMAC Diversity on Boards of Directors 
Report 
During the financial year 2009/2010, the Australian government 
commissioned three independent reviews seeking recommendations on listed-
entity corporate governance practices, with an emphasis on gender 
diversity.127 The commissioned reports were: 
• The CAMAC Report, Aspects of Market Integrity, June 2009; 
• The CAMAC Report, Diversity on Boards of Directors, August 2009; 
and 
• The Productivity Commission Inquiry Report, Executive 
Remuneration in Australia, January 2010. 
With some studies identifying a causal link between board diversity and better 
corporate performance, CAMAC128 investigated board diversity in 2009. The 
CAMAC Report in turn contributed to the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council’s construction of the Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations with 2010 Amendments which will be discussed further 
below. On 9 September 2008, Senator Nick Sherry (Minister for 
Superannuation and Corporate Law) directed CAMAC to investigate and 
advise upon board diversity at the March 2009 meeting of the Ministerial 
Council for Corporations.129 The completed report, including 
recommendations, was entitled Diversity on Boards of Directors Report, and 
was delivered to the Minister on 2 March 2009.130 
                                                 
127 ASX Corporate Governance Council, ‘Amendments to the Corporate Governance Principles 
and Recommendations 2nd Edition’ (Response Paper to Submissions, 30 June 2010) 
(‘Governance Principles’) 3 <http://203.170.82.73/~firstgro/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ 
2010/07/cg_response_paper_june_2010.pdf>. 
128 CAMAC, above n 34, 1. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
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B Gender Diversity on Australian Boards Compared to 
Other Countries 
Indeed, Australian women represent 45.8 per cent of the total labour force,131 
placing 23rd among 50 participating nations in Forbes’ 2012 ‘female 
employment share rank’.132 The 2011 Australian sex ratio (the number of 
males per hundred females) was 98.9 across a total population of 22.3 million, 
meaning that women comprise 51 per cent of the Australian population.133 
However, as pointed out above, at 28 May 2014, only 18.2 per cent of ASX 
200 directorships were held by females.134 The proportion of women on 
boards in Australia compared to Norway remains low, evidenced by 
Australia’s ranking of 21 among 50 participating countries in Forbes’ 2012 
Global Diversity Ranking.135 Forbes commissioned Oxford Economics to 
build a global ranking model, which was ‘unique and first-of-its-kind’.136 
Australia’s middle of the field female directorship ranking is unfortunate 
considering that several participating countries have ‘insular approach[es] to 
boardroom diversity’.137 Japan and the United Arab Emirates (placed 49th and 
48th), for example, recorded female corporate board representation of only 0.9 
per cent138 within strong cultures that traditionally favour male-dominated 
leadership and governance. 
In Forbes’ female directorship ranking, Australia placed behind New Zealand 
(13th) and the US (14th) but ahead of the United Kingdom (UK) (28th) among 
nations with which it has close cultural ties.139 The five best performing 
nations were Norway (36 per cent), the Philippines (23 per cent) and Sweden 
                                                 
131 ABS, Cat 6202.0 –– Labour Force, Australia, Status by Sex–Trend March 2012 (12 April 
2012) in Australian Government Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency, 
Gender Workplace Statistics at a Glance (October 2013) <http://www.wgea.gov.au/sites/ 
default/files/2013-10-10-Stats-at-a-Glance_0.pdf >. 
132 Forbes Insights, above n 34, 10. 
133 ABS, above n 66.  
134 AICD, above n 57. 
135 Forbes Insights, above n 34, 4. 
136 Ibid. The model assessed and compared employee and board diversity ‘across 50 global 
economies, 14 industrial sectors and nine occupations’. Forbes’ research data was collected 
by Oxford Economics ‘in early 2011 and in most cases represents the years 2008, 2009 or 
2010’. 
137 Ibid 8, 10–11. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
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(23 per cent), Latvia (22 per cent) and Slovakia (22 per cent).140 The five 
worst performing nations were Portugal (0.4 per cent), Japan (0.9 per cent), 
the United Arab Emirates (0.9 per cent), Korea (1 per cent) and Chile (2.4 per 
cent).141 Forbes’ study is comprehensive and unique, providing a detailed, 
comparative analysis of gender diversity around the world; however, data was 
collected in early 2011 and represents 2008, 2009 or 2010 — meaning that 
Australia’s rapid progress since 2010 is not exhibited in the Forbes results. A 
less comprehensive but more current study performed by GMI and based 
upon December 2011 data was released on 8 March 2012 to coincide with 
International Women’s Day.142 GMI’s study revealed that Australia’s rate of 
increase in female directorships during 2011 had elevated it above several 
nations behind which it had previously lagged.143 In Part VII below, the 
authors analyse statistics regarding male and female percentages of 
directorships for ASX 200 companies in greater detail.  
C Australia’s Weighted Composite Gender Diversity 
Ranking 
Whilst Australian board-level gender diversity remains well short of 
international benchmarks, Australia’s weighted composite gender diversity 
ranking is more impressive (12th).144 In order to reach the composite gender 
diversity rank, four measurable elements of gender diversity were considered 
and results were weighted to determine the relevant placing for each of the 50 
participating countries. The four elements were: female employment share 
rank (for which Australia placed 23rd), female activity rate rank (12th), women 
on boards rank (21st), and women in Parliament rank (17th). Australia’s 
composite weighted result was 0.63, placing it 12th.145 By comparison, the 
first placed nation, Norway, achieved an overall weighted score of 0.90, 
placing fifth, third, first and eighth in each of the four respective measures 
identified above. 
                                                 
140 Ibid 9. 
141 Ibid 9. 
142 Kimberly Gladham and Michelle Lamb, GMI Ratings’ 2012 Women on Boards Survey 
(March 2012) GMI Ratings, 1 <http://library.constantcontact.com/download/get/file/ 
1102561686275-86/GMIRatings_WOB_032012.pdf>. 
143 Ibid 8. 
144 Forbes Insights, above n 34, 10. 
145 Ibid. 
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The composite gender diversity rank may be interpreted as a leading indicator 
of board gender diversity performance. Its strong performance in the four 
elements studied suggests that Australia is improving opportunities for 
minority groups and enhancing diversity in all levels of the economy and 
corporate life.146 
D Cultural Change a Driving Force for Diversity 
A change in cultural attitudes, so that the advantages of diversity are 
recognised and female participation encouraged, will increase the quantity of 
qualified, experienced female directors in a sustainable and productive 
manner. Current data demonstrates improvement in Australia’s board-level 
gender diversity, with 22 per cent of all new 2012 ASX 200 board 
appointments being women (or a total of 41 women).147 Strong progression 
towards equitable representation has continued over three years, with 68 
female appointments in 2011 (comprising 28 per cent of the total) and 56 
(comprising 25 per cent of new appointments) in 2010.148 
E The ASX Corporate Governance Council’s 
Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations  
The document entitled Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations with 2010 Amendments was adopted by the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, following public consultation. The document came into 
effect from the first financial year commencing on or after 1 January 2011149 
and, within established principles, addressed diversity-related issues. Principle 
2 in the document deals with the issue of structuring the board to add value. 
Specifically, Principle 2.4 (‘The board should establish a nomination 
committee’)150 requires boards to report upon director recruitment, including 
                                                 
146 No director should be appointed to any board based solely upon the diversity group they 
represent: O’Brien, above n 120. In order for the talent pool to be fully utilised, opportunities 
for all individuals — particularly those from under-represented minority groups — to become 
sufficiently qualified and prepared for directorship is essential. 
147 AICD, above n 57. 
148 Ibid. 
149 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Governance Principles, above n 127, 7. 
150 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations Summary of 30 June 2010 Amendments (30 June 2010) 
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procedures to consider talent from diverse sources. In its 2009 report, 
CAMAC had recommended that ‘a starting point in any move to encourage 
greater gender (or other) diversity on boards is to … make their appointment 
processes more transparent and to formalise their processes for keeping board 
composition under review in the light of performance and changing needs’.151 
No change to the principle was made; however, additions were recommended 
under ‘Selection and appointment process and re-election of directors’, with 
the aim of promoting diversity by encouraging companies to consider broad 
sources when recruiting directors.152 
Principle 2.5 (‘Companies should disclose the process for evaluating the 
performance of the board, its committees and individual directors’) provides 
additional commentary regarding director ‘induction and education’, company 
culture and values, and director interactions with senior management.153 A 
risk of continuing to increase female directorships rapidly is that a possible 
shortage of qualified candidates with directorship experience or preparation 
may arise. On 1 January 2010, Australian ASX 200 company boards had only 
8.3 per cent female directorship representation.154 Indeed, ‘55% of the new 
female appointments made in 2010 were women who had not previously sat 
on an ASX 200 board’ and as female representation continues to increase, this 
figure is likely to remain high.155 A fundamental aim of this principle is to 
support the transition of inexperienced directors into the governance structure, 
to improve their likelihood of performing well and, hence, to reinforce the 
corporation’s decision to recruit diverse talent. The Australian voluntary 
regime aims to improve gender equality at board level, whilst ensuring 
optimal corporate performance.156 Encouraging a rapid, substantial and 
continuous increase in this rate necessarily requires a substantial increase in 
the number of first-time female directors. Induction is imperative to support 
this process. The potential lack of cohesion of diverse boards has been noted 
as interfering with problem-solving efficacy. Detailing meeting arrangements 
                                                                                                                    
(‘Recommendations Summary’) <http://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-compliance/cg_ 
comparative_table_june_2010.pdf> 1–2. 
151 CAMAC, above n 34, 52–3. 
152 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Recommendations Summary, above n 150, 1–2. 
153 Ibid 2. 
154 AICD, above n 57. 
155 Broderick, above n 54. 
156 Ibid. 
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as well as ‘director interaction[s] with each other, senior executives and other 
stakeholders’ helps the cohesiveness of a diverse board.157 
Principle 3 promotes ethical and responsible decision-making, with Principle 
3.2 representing the most significant amendment to the ASX’s Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations. It requires the establishment 
of a diversity policy, the implementation of measurable objectives and the 
adoption of annual monitoring.158 To assist corporations in their adoption of 
the amended recommendations, Principle 3.2 provides a definition of 
diversity, stating that it ‘includes but is not limited to gender, age, ethnicity 
and cultural background’.159 Measurable objectives are recommended to 
‘identify how you measure achievement of gender diversity objectives, for 
example, proportion of women in the company, senior executive positions and 
on the board’.160 Supported by a diversity policy and annual monitoring, 
corporations that adopt the amended Principle 3.2 will be able to measure 
progress towards diversity targets (objectives). The implementation of 
measurable objectives allows variances to be identified, discussed and 
explained. Many subscribe to the adage that ‘what gets measured gets done’ 
and the strength of this amendment is that, whilst compliance is voluntary, it 
possesses a measurable element, which demands the attention of key senior 
personnel in Australian corporations. The progress of Australian companies 
towards their own pre-determined, measurable diversity objectives must be 
tabled, monitored and discussed periodically; in that way, diversity becomes a 
significant issue within the corporation. Feedback from public consultation, 
with which the ASX’s Corporate Governance Council agreed, noted the 
inflexibility with which companies quantified measurable objectives in 
diversity policy.161 
Principle 3.3162 requires the disclosure by companies of measurable objectives 
and annual progress. Accompanying commentary highlights the need for a 
governance culture which is supportive of diversity and female 
participation.163 Specifically, ‘[c]ompanies should disclose in each annual 
                                                 
157 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Recommendations Summary, above n 150, 2. 
158 Ibid 3. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
161 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Governance Principles, above n 127, 6. 
162 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Recommendations Summary, above n 150, 5.  
163 ‘The role of shareholders is enhanced if they are fully informed of the policy and 
measurable objectives which facilitate tracking and monitoring against the objectives’: ibid 5. 
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report the measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity set by the 
board in accordance with the diversity policy and progress towards achieving 
them’.164 
Principle 3.4 requires disclosure in annual reports of the numbers of female 
employees, senior executives and directors.165 Additional commentary on the 
Principle suggests that the remuneration committee/board should, at least 
annually, review and report upon gender balance at all company levels. 
Principle 8 promotes fair and responsible166 remuneration, with Principle 8.1 
requiring that the board should establish a remuneration committee, and 
expecting the board or remuneration committee to consider remuneration by 
gender as well as making some comments on gender-based remuneration.  
The ASX’s Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations are 
developed on an ‘if not, why not’ basis,167 enabling listed companies to elect 
not to adopt any recommendation, provided they disclose reasons why it was 
not adopted. Since their introduction during 2003, the principles and 
recommendations have been voluntary. However, the cooperative premise of 
the document and its value as a tool to analyse the corporate governance 
performance of Australian companies has ensured that it was adopted by 
almost all listed companies.168 The Australian framework supports the 
principle that it is ultimately ‘for the market to pass judgement on the 
corporate governance practices of Australian companies’169 and it is hoped 
that the ‘cooperative goodwill of listed entities’ will continue with regard to 
board gender diversity, avoiding the need for legislative intervention.170 
                                                 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid 5–6. 
166 Ibid 7–8. 
167 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Recommendations Summary, above n 150, 2, 6.  
168 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Governance Principles, above n 127, 2. 
169 ‘… not the Council or ASX’: ibid. 
170 The ‘[c]ooperative goodwill of listed entities has contributed to a high standard of corporate 
governance practice in Australia without the agency costs of “black letter” law common in 
other markets’: ibid. 
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F Employee Diversity in Australia  
Australia was placed fourth out of 50 nations in Forbes’ 2012 ‘global index of 
employee diversity’,171 a study analysing various diversity elements, including 
gender, age, country of birth, part-time or full-time employment, education, 
income and sector.172 New Zealand, one of Australia’s nearest neighbours in 
both proximity and cultural values,173 ranked second.174 The result is 
encouraging for workplace diversity and the provision of equal opportunities 
for employees. The Forbes’ study was limited, however, by inconsistent 
availability of statistical data for key diversity elements in participating 
nations. For example, the US and UK are the only two countries tracking 
employment data on ethnicity.175 However, considering the elements of 
diversity studied and their comparative results, Australia rates in the upper 
echelon of nations providing equal opportunities to all employees, established 
by the fact of employee diversity.  
G Long-Term Flow-On Effects of Employee Diversity 
on Board Diversity 
As a leading indicator, the composite index of employee diversity bodes well 
for long-term Australian board diversity. By committing to diversity at the 
employee level, across all sectors of the economy and with consideration of 
all diversity elements, Australia is creating a culture of openness and 
acceptance of human differences. Acceptance should reduce bias, enhance 
employee diversity and provide opportunities for skills development, hence 
ensuring that individuals from diverse groups are better prepared to assume 
leadership and directorship positions in the future.  
Investment and commitment at employee and management levels will prepare 
individuals from diverse representative groups for directorship positions via a 
‘push’ strategy. Such an approach requires a long-term perspective but, in 
conjunction with adequate board training and appropriate measures that 
                                                 
171 Forbes Insights, above n 34, 14–15. 
172 Ibid 12–15. 
173 Regional Language Network, Australia and New Zealand — People and Culture: A Guide 
for Business (16 July 2007) Hampshire Chamber of Commerce <http://www.hampshire 
chamber.co.uk/docs/Australia%20and%20New%20Zealand.pdf>; The Free Dictionary, 
Antipodean <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Antipodeans>. 
174 Forbes Insights, above n 34, 14. 
175 Ibid 18. 
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encourage corporations to pursue diversity, it may achieve balanced corporate 
governance results in the long term. 
Despite there being a significant difference between managing and directing a 
corporation,176 directorship is commonly preceded by senior-executive 
experience.177 Only 24 per cent of Australian senior managers are women;178 
however, Australia has the greatest proportion of female CEOs (30 per cent) 
of any country — an enviable result and a leading indicator for future 
Australian board-level gender diversity.179 The promotion of diversity at all 
corporation levels and across each segment of the economy provides Australia 
with an opportunity to nurture qualified board talent from currently under-
represented minority groups. 
H Australia’s Voluntary Regime: To Force or Not to 
Force? 
In April 2011, Elizabeth Broderick, Sex Discrimination Commissioner and 
the then Age Discrimination Commissioner of the Australian Human Rights 
Commission, noted that ‘most organisations had interpreted “measurable 
objectives” [in Principle 3.2 of the ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations] as targets’.180 In a 
speech to the third Women on Boards Conference, ‘Gender Matters’, 
                                                 
176 See sources in Jean Jacques du Plessis, Anil Hargovan and Mirko Bagaric, Principles of 
Contemporary Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 78–9. 
177 John Cloney, Chairman of QBE, notes that ‘[q]uite simply, there are fewer women in the 
pool’, with regard to directorship selection. ‘Right or wrong, a lot of companies look for 
directors with CEO experience and that instantly knocks out a large percentage of female 
candidates. If you then say you want a director with CEO experience in a publicly-listed 
company, that knocks out another big percentage’, in Stuart, above n 116.  
178 Compared to the global average of 21 per cent: Grant Thornton, Women in Senior 
Management: Still Not Enough (8 March 2012) 5 <http://www.grantthornton.co.nz/Assets/ 
documents/pubSeminars/IBR-2012-women-in-senior-management.pdf>. However, this data 
shows substantial improvement on the 2010 rate for female listed-company senior executives, 
which was only 10.7 per cent: Stuart, above n 116. 
179 Grant Thornton, above n 178, 8. However, recent research performed by the Australian 
Council of Super Investors (ACSI) revealed that, among the ASX 200, females account for 
only 4 per cent (8) of total CEOs and 4 per cent (8) of board chairs: Rachel Alembakis, ACSI 
Criticises Slow Pace of Women Appointed to ASX Boards (8 March 2013) The Sustainability 
Report <http://www.thesustainabilityreport.com.au/acsi-criticises-slow-pace-of-women-
appointed-to-asx-boards/3439/>.  
180 Broderick, above n 34. 
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Broderick re-stated the Australian Human Rights Commission’s 
recommendation, contained in the 2010 Gender Equality Blueprint,181 that all 
publicly listed companies set minimum board representation targets of 40 per 
cent by gender, to be achieved by 2015.182  
The Australian Human Rights Commission had made 15 recommendations in 
its 2010 Blueprint, all aimed at promoting gender diversity and equality.183 
Recommendation 7, ‘Promoting women in Leadership’, had specified that ‘a 
target of 40% representation of each gender on all publicly-listed Boards in 
Australia, to be achieved over five years, should be promoted’.184 It had 
further been recommended that ‘[i]f progress is not made, the Australian 
Government should consider legislating to require publicly-listed companies 
and other large employers to achieve a mandatory gender diversity quota of a 
minimum of 40% of both genders within a specified timeframe [five years], 
failing which penalties will be imposed’.185 
Whilst the target is ambitious, it is comparable with targets set in other 
countries186 and must be pursued if Australia is to prove that voluntary 
regimes are a viable alternative to legislation. There are several reasons why it 
is important that Australia achieve the target.  
First, the Australian Human Rights Commission is a respected organisation 
and its recommendations are considered credible. Second, the 
recommendation provides a quantitative target against which Australian 
company performance may be measured for critical analysis and to ensure 
progress towards a goal. Third, the recommended gender target of 40 per cent 
is comparable with the quota laws set by international leaders, such as 
Norway, since 2003. Fourth, the recommendation was made in response to, 
and fits comfortably within, the structure of Australia’s voluntary regime 
(implemented via the 2010 Amendments to the ASX Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations).  
                                                 
181 Elizabeth Broderick, Cassandra Goldie and Elena Rosenman, 2010 Gender Equality 
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Fifth, the proposed timeframe (five years) is comparable with quota 
legislation timeframes implemented in other nations — including Norway187 
and France188 — providing a realistic benchmark against which the progress 
of Australia’s voluntary regime can be assessed. Sixth, the recommendation 
takes Australia’s voluntary regime one step further in that it quantifies the 
measurable objectives as targets, in a manner consistent with international 
leaders, and it sets a reasonable timeframe for the targets to be met. In doing 
so, the Australian Human Rights Commission encourages Australian 
companies to commit to targets and achieve them. 
Last, it is sometimes argued that the adoption of legislated quotas is 
considered to be one board gender diversity mechanism that can achieve best 
practice targets.189 Structuring a voluntary mechanism with quantifiable 
targets comparable to those legislated in other nations is an effective method 
of benchmarking Australian progress.190 For the benefits of a voluntary 
regime to be enjoyed by the Australian economy, there must be evidence that 
it is an effective alternative to legislation. The Australian Human Rights 
Commission recommendations certainly progress the voluntary regime further 
than the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations alone. 
As of April 2011, Broderick considered that Australia needed to attain the 
following targets to achieve 40 per cent female representation on publicly 
listed boards by the end of 2015: 17 per cent by the end of 2011; 25 per cent 
by the end of 2012; 30 per cent by the end of 2013; 35 per cent by the end of 
2014; and a minimum of 40 per cent by the end of 2015.191 As at 28 May 
2014, ASX 200 boards had increased female directorships to 15.7 per cent.192 
However, this improvement still trails the Australian Human Rights 
Commission’s 2011 year-end target by 1.3 per cent, the 2012 year-end target 
by 9.3 per cent, and the 2013 year-end target by 14.3 per cent.193 Obviously, 
progress may occur at different rates. However, it is important to track 
performance in order to identify shortcomings. 
                                                 
187 Ibid. 
188 Deloitte, above n 34, 15. 
189 Catherine Casey, Renate Skibnes and Judith K Pringle, ‘Gender Equality and Corporate 
Governance: Policy Strategies in Norway and New Zealand’ (2011) 18(6) Gender Work and 
Organization 613. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Broderick, above n 54.  
192 AICD, above n 57. 
193 Ibid.  
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VIII ARE THERE GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM IN AUSTRALIA? 
As at January 2012, there were 64 ASX 200 companies (32 per cent of the 
ASX 200) without one female board member, while 41 of the ASX 200 
boards did not have any women by 28 May 2014, representing a percentage of 
20.5 per cent.194 The progress seems steady for listed companies, but it should 
be pointed out that some not-for-profit organisations and universities 
demonstrate much higher female governance representation.195 In fact, 
research conducted in 2008 by a group of leading women called ‘Women on 
Boards’ revealed that women held 30 per cent of the directorships on 
Australia’s top not-for-profit organisations (by revenue), and, as early as 
2004, more than 75 per cent of not-for-profit organisations had female board 
members.196 Furthermore, as early as 2008, female governance representation 
among the ‘Group of Eight’ universities was at levels equal to those achieved 
by Norway’s corporate sector in 2012 (36.8 per cent).197 As at 30 June 2012, 
women comprised 38.4 per cent of government board positions, assuming 41 
per cent of the new appointments during the 2011/2012 financial year.198 
Government, not-for-profit organisations and university appointments, which 
demonstrate much higher female governance-level representation, are 
encouraging. Nevertheless, it should be clear that, despite the noted 
improvement and clear potential, Australia has ‘a long way to go’.199 
The 2010 amendments to the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s 
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations that required board 
diversity policies or an explanation why one was not adopted (under the ‘if 
not, why not’ principle) provided an impetus for an immediate improvement 
in the number of female appointments to ASX 200 directorships, and 
represented a milestone in Australia’s pursuit of best practice targets through 
a voluntary mechanism. As can be seen from Figure 1, immediate results 
                                                 
194 Gladham and Lamb, above n 142. 
195 AICD, above n 57. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid. 
198 This progress suggests the government is on track to achieve its target of 40% women and 
40% men on its boards by 2015: Australian Government Department of Families, Housing 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, Gender Balance on Australian Government 
Boards Report 2011–2012 (15 November 2012) Australian Government Department of Social 
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199 AICD, above n 57. 
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followed after the amendments and it created optimism that Australia’s push 
to voluntarily achieve best practice targets among its listed companies would 
be effective.  
Figure 1 
 
* Source: Figure developed from publicly available data from the AICD webpage. 
** YTD for 2014 was 28 May 2014, which indicates a projected 57.6 female appointments for 
2014. 
 
As will be apparent from Figures 1 and 2, ASX 200 companies have rarely 
appointed female directors prior to 2010, when the ASX’s Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations were amended. 200 Only 5 per 
cent of new appointments in 2009 were women, preceded by 8 per cent in 
both 2008 and 2007.201 In 2010, female appointments increased 460 per cent 
and, in 2011, they rose a further 120 per cent (on the 2009 base level). After 
the rapid increases of 2010 and 2011, new female directorships as a 
percentage of total new board appointments have decreased among ASX 200 
companies to 22 per cent in both 2012 and 2013.202 Although the combined 
increase of 580 per cent on 2009 base level figures during 2010 and 2011 is 
                                                 
200 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Governance Principles, above n 127. 
201 AICD, above n 57. 
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striking, further investigation reveals a more sobering underlying reality. In 
2009, 10 females represented 5 per cent of all appointments to ASX 200 
company boards (10 women compared to 190 men, for a total of 200 new 
appointments). In 2010, 56 females represented 25 per cent of total new 
appointments (56 women compared to 168 men for a total of 224 new 
appointments), and in 2011, 68 females represented 28 per cent of the total 
(68 females compared to 174 males for a total of 242 new appointments). 
Figure 2 illustrates the gender gap in new appointments to ASX 200 company 
boards over recent years. 
Figure 2 
 
* Source: Figure developed from publicly available data from the AICD webpage. 
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An issue of concern is that, despite improvement, Australia is a long way 
from reaching best practice targets — even among its new appointments. To 
achieve a minimum representation of 40 per cent for each gender across the 
entire ASX 200, new appointments and existing seats would need to be 
distributed between genders in the targeted proportion. To remove male 
directors from existing seats in favour of females would initially seem 
difficult and contrary to the spirit of a voluntary system. The making of new 
appointments, however, provides an opportunity for ASX 200 companies to 
alter gender balance with more ease and flexibility. Despite that opportunity, 
as is clear from Figure 2, the ASX 200’s new appointments have fallen short 
of best practice targets every year. Increasing new female appointments to 
targeted levels alone will not achieve best practice levels across the entire 
ASX 200. Indeed, fewer than 10 per cent of ASX 200 director seats turn over 
annually;203 the effect of new female appointments is diluted in instances 
where retired seats have been held by other females. Bringing the number of 
new female appointments to best practice levels is the next step. Despite its 
necessity, however, meeting best practice criteria alone will be insufficient to 
achieve the desired targets within reasonable timeframes. 
                                                 
203 Laurence Lock Lee, ‘Are Board Turnover Rates Limiting Diversity Opportunities and 
Growth?’ in Laurence Lock Lee, Governance in a Networked World (14 January 2013) 
<http://blog.optimice.com.au/?p=111>. 





* Source: Figure developed from publicly available data from the AICD webpage. 
** YTD 2014 is 28 May 2014, which indicates a projected 43.68 female appointments for 
2014. 
 
Figure 3 indicates that, despite the striking 580 per cent uplift in female 
appointments during 2010 and 2011, the real percentage of female directors 
across the entire ASX 200 increased only 5.1 per cent (from 8.3 per cent at the 
start of 2010 to 13.4 per cent by the end of 2011). Remarkable (percentage) 
increases in new female appointments effected minor increases in female 
representation across the ASX 200 for two reasons. First, starting from a low 
base in 2009, minor improvement resulted in substantial percentage increases, 
thus overstating performance. Second, new female appointments are 
overshadowed by an already male dominated ASX 200. With ASX 200 
companies averaging 7.7 directors each, there are approximately 1540 
directorships within the ASX 200.204 The addition of 124 new female 
                                                 
204 Ibid. Clearly, the annual rate of ASX 200 vacancies varies considerably. In 2010, 56 women 
represented 25 per cent of new ASX 200 appointments, amounting to 224 seats turned over 
(56/0.25). In 2011, 68 women represented 28 per cent of total new appointments, for a total of 
243 (68/0.28) seats turned over: AICD, above n 57. 
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directorships during 2010/2011 (56 in 2010 and 68 in 2011) only increased 
female representation to 13.4 per cent of all ASX 200 company boards (a real 
increase of only 5.1 per cent over two years, at an average of 2.55% per year). 
In the following two years and four months to 28 May 2014, the real 
percentage increase of ASX 200 directorships held by women has slowed 




* Source: Figure developed from publicly available data from the AICD webpage. 
** YTD 2014 is 28 May 2014, which indicates a projected 43.68 female appointments for 
2014. 
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Figure 4 indicates that the percentage of females across the entire ASX 200 
increased 2 per cent in 2012 to 15.4 per cent and a further 1.9 per cent to 17.3 
per cent by 31 December 2013. During the five months to 28 May 2014, an 
additional 24 women have been appointed to ASX 200 boards, pushing 
female representation up to 18.2 per cent — the highest in Australia’s history 
— and reducing the gender gap to 63.6 per cent. 
In almost four and a half years — from 1 January 2010 to 28 May 2014 — 
Australia has increased the real percentage of female directors across the ASX 
200 by 9.9 per cent (from 8.3 per cent to 18.2 per cent). When presented as a 
percentage increase (119.3 per cent),205 this result is impressive. Combined 
with the previously discussed statistics, these improvements may suggest 
deceptively rapid progress towards best practice targets, which may reduce 
pressure on and scrutiny of ASX 200 companies’ board gender diversity in the 
short term. However, when the statistical perspective is switched to what 
remains to be achieved, the underlying reality becomes clearer. 
In order to achieve 40 per cent representation of both genders on ASX 200 
company boards, Australia must further increase real female representation 
across the entire ASX 200 by 21.8 per cent. In order to achieve this target, 
within the five-year time period adopted in numerous jurisdictions and hence 
to justify the voluntary mechanism as a true equivalent to mandatory quotas, 
the real average annual rate of increase achieved over the past four and a half 
years (9.9 per cent, or an average of 2.2 per cent per year) would need to be 
increased by more than a factor of 20 in the next six months. At the current 
rate of progress (9.9 per cent over four and a half years), it will take Australia 
another 9.9 years to achieve 40 per cent female representation, with the target 
being achieved some time in mid-2024. 
In order to meet the 40 per cent target from current levels (28 May 2014), 
women must be appointed to nearly one-quarter (21.8 per cent) of all board 
positions across the entire ASX 200, without any currently serving female 
directors relinquishing their positions to males. However, ASX 200 boards 
have an average of 7.7 directors with a turnover rate of 10.7 per cent, which 
provides only 165 directorship vacancies per year.206 Given that there are 
                                                 
205 This is calculated as [(18.2-8.3)/8.3*100]. 
206 The turnover rate and average vacancies per year are based upon research performed by 
Governance in a Networked World. Board turnover rates were determined by measuring 
‘year-to-year changes in board memberships since 2004’. It was noted that ‘[o]f the 539 
companies listed for the full period, 212 have on average 10.2% turnover. 25 companies had 
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1540 ASX 200 directors, women must be appointed to an additional 336 seats 
(21.8 per cent of 1540) to meet the minimum 40 per cent target for each 
gender (assuming the composition of ASX 200 board seats remains at 1540). 
For Australia to reach this target within a reasonable timeframe (the end of 
2015 has been suggested as reasonable) — with only 165 vacancies available 
per year — every single appointment would need to be female for the 
remainder of 2014 (96 seats) and for all of 2015 (165 seats), plus 75 presently 
serving male directors would need to be replaced by women. We can 
confidently predict that that this will not occur. Indeed, it has been postulated 
that the best-case scenario under a voluntary mechanism is to anticipate 
women being appointed to a maximum of 25 per cent of directorship 
vacancies,207 meaning that it would take a further nine years to achieve 40 per 
cent representation of both genders.208 However, it is important to note a 
statistical reality: the recruitment of females at a rate of 25 per cent of total 
new appointments only increases female representation across the entire ASX 
200 because women currently hold less than 25 per cent of all seats. Once the 
ASX 200 achieves 25 per cent female representation (and assuming that 
director seats are retired proportionately to their appointment), allocating 25 
per cent of new seats to women will only maintain that level. As the 
achievement of ‘critical mass’ will render further progress uncertain, so too, 
will the 25 per cent ceiling present an obstacle that must be negotiated if 
Australia is to make its voluntary system succeed.  
A voluntary regime would require ASX 200 companies to terminate large 
numbers of male directors and replace them with females in order to achieve 
the same results as a mandatory regime within a reasonable timeframe. This 
may seem an extreme measure and unlikely to be implemented. In order for a 
voluntary regime to achieve the same results as a mandatory regime, it is an 
option that needs to be considered seriously. The general criticisms of the 
voluntary system are that it is ‘slow’ and achieves ‘small’ reductions in 
                                                                                                                    
experienced no changes at all over the 8-year period. Of the 1,652 companies listed for more 
than 12 months, the average annual turnover is just 13%, and for the ASX200 10.7%’: Lee, 
above n 203. 
207 Ibid. The ACSI anticipates that 40 per cent representation of each gender will not be 
achieved at current rates until 2030: Alembakis, above n 179. 
208 Lee, above n 203. Below the ASX 200, where female participation falls, it is anticipated that 
this will take 13 years to achieve. 
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gender imbalance at board level.209 The challenge is immense; the rewards are 
great, but the risks are real.  
As more nations implement quota legislation and progress towards best 
practice targets, Australia will face greater political pressure to report 
comparable statistics. Australian companies must redress gender imbalance or 
risk losing the benefits of a voluntary system. International comparisons with 
Australia’s progress over coming years will be intriguing, as more nations roll 
out quota legislation. 
IX SOME TRENDS AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
A Holistic Approach to Board Diversity in the 
International Context 
Nations aiming to achieve board level diversity should be alert to the benefits 
of holistic approaches, which may help to achieve sustainable reductions in 
gender imbalance. Specifically, the design and implementation of 
collaborative push and pull strategies in conjunction may help to realise such 
objectives. Simply setting quota legislation targets and ‘pulling’ minority 
groups onto boards to satisfy reporting requirements risks corporate 
performance suffering under the governance of unqualified, inexperienced 
directors. Such an occurrence would be detrimental to long-term board 
diversity and equality. By comparison, the development of expertise and 
qualifications in individuals from all (diverse) talent pools provides a better 
opportunity for directorship success; it supports improved corporate 
performance and hence reinforces diverse director appointments. 
The ‘right [board-level] gender balance’ can be achieved through the 
recruitment of an appropriate mix of well-qualified directors from all talent 
pools, with a view to furthering a corporation’s objectives.210 This method 
acknowledges ‘gender’ within the broader context of diversity.211 Corporate 
Australia is being encouraged to embrace such an approach, and gender 
diversity has, since 2010, been a prominent feature of the voluntary corporate 
                                                 
209 Armstrong and Walby, above n 5. 
210 CAMAC, above n 34, 51. 
211 Ibid. 
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governance regime applicable to ASX listed companies.212 The use of such an 
approach follows its success in the government sector and some not-for-profit 
sectors in Australia. 
Some scholars correlate board diversity with corporate performance; gender 
imbalance spawns social inequity and disparate participation levels. Hence, it 
is imperative that Australian board and senior executive diversity continues to 
increase. The ASX Corporate Governance Council argues that companies and 
countries that are able to use all talent will be better placed to achieve global 
(and local) success, whilst enjoying the benefits of greater equality.213 In order 
to reduce board gender imbalance, strategies addressing the underlying causes 
of the imbalance need to be implemented, and rates of progression towards 
equality achieved in recent years need to be maintained.  
B Not-for-Profit and Government Experience 
In the not-for-profit and government sectors in Australia, a range of methods 
has been used to achieve greater board diversity. They have included policy 
change; coalitions of support from experienced male corporate board 
directors, with experienced business and government board members acting 
together; and changes in the organisational culture of certain types of not-for-
profit organisations. Elizabeth Broderick has noted that the barriers to the 
equitable progression of women in the workplace fall into three categories, 
which broadly correlate to the argument about the need for change in the outer 
and inner context and through content. These barriers are: 
(a) belief barriers — deeply held cultural beliefs such as the good 
mother stereotype, the ideal worker stereotype (content); 
(b) cultural barriers — selection, promotion and career 
development systems which disadvantage women (inner 
context); and 
                                                 
212 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Governance Principles, above n 127. 
213 Promoting gender equity at board level would further improve the economic equality 
between the sexes. ‘It’s worth noting that greater economic equality between men and women 
has been shown to reduce poverty rates, boost GDP and lead to better governance. In order to 
improve female participation rates, governments can adopt a number of proven approaches 
such as flex-time initiatives, free or subsidized childcare, and tax breaks for married couples 
when both partners work’: Forbes Insights, above n 34, 8.  
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(c) structural barriers — the lack of affordable childcare, no paid 
parental leave scheme214 (outer context). 
With mandatory regimes, it has been proven that corporate boards in those 
countries having adopted them can achieve targeted levels of gender 
representation. Following the argument through, if targeted voluntary levels 
are ‘equitable’ then the ‘right gender balance’ may be achieved. 
C Mandated Quotas Will Achieve Results, but Is It the 
Desirable Method? 
Mandated quota legislation in countries such as Norway has achieved gender 
diversity. Norway is the country with the highest participation of women at 
board level (36 per cent), the result of mandating a quota system for publicly 
listed companies.215 However, the pressure of legal sanctions may lead to 
inappropriate directorship appointments. Further, legal sanctions may alienate 
those who might otherwise champion change for greater board diversity. It 
was reported in Norway in 2012216 that around 70 female managers share 300 
board positions among themselves.217 They have been nicknamed ‘golden 
skirts’.218 This development is viewed with scepticism, especially considering 
the potential conflicts of interest associated with membership on multiple 
boards.219 There is a risk that Australia may follow this pattern, particularly 
among the ASX 200 where 164 women currently hold 230 directorships 
(equating to 28 per cent of women having multiple directorships).220 The 
higher level of concentrated participation by females has been expressed as a 
concern, with ‘females by far having more multiple board memberships’.221 
                                                 
214 Broderick, above n 54. 
215 Forbes Insights, above n 34, 10. 
216 See Du Plessis, Saenger and Foster, above n 49, 247. 
217 Commentary, ‘Goldröcke und Großmütter an der Macht’, FAZ, 15 February 2011 (Nr 38), 
18. 
218 See Mark Lewis, ‘Most of the Women Who Make up Norway’s “Golden Skirts” Are Non-
Execs’, The Guardian (online), 1 July 2011 <http://www.theguardian.com/ 
business/2011/jul/01/norway-golden-skirt-quota-boardroom>. 
219 Gerd Krieger, ‘Keine gesetzliche Frauenquote für Aufsichtsräte’ (2011) 61 Anwaltsblatt 
918. 
220 Alembakis, above n 179. 
221 Laurence Lock Lee, ‘The ‘Sisterhood’ Goes Missing at Board Level’ in Lee, above n 203. 
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D Significant Progress without Mandatory Quota 
Legislation 
Initiatives introduced through the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations are astute and have driven substantial improvement.222 Fair 
and ethical remuneration, the promotion of a culture of female participation, 
the provision of sufficient induction, training and education for new directors, 
commitment to diversity policy, and the establishment of transparent board 
appointment procedures with a focus on considering all talent sources, are just 
some actions introduced through the 2010 amendments to the ASX Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations.223 Other actions which might 
be pursued include extending the mentoring of potential female directors by 
experienced directors; the mentoring of women by men in CEO positions; the 
provision of a voice for change for women through peak bodies, such as 
Women on Boards; and the lobbying of government for change in the 
corporate sector, as has occurred in the government and some parts of the not-
for-profit sectors. 
Despite the apparent success of Australia’s voluntary regime, the test of its 
substance will arise in coming years. Australian corporate governance will 
face challenges in pushing beyond the point of ‘critical mass’ and closing the 
gap between the current level of 15.8 per cent female board participation and 
best practice (40 per cent) in the face of competition from countries which 
have enacted legislative quotas. 
Australia has a strong voluntary strategy, which is arguably preferable to 
legislation. Both the government sector and parts of the not-for-profit sector 
provide lessons on how to achieve board diversity in its broadest sense in a 
voluntary regime. Driven by a desire for continuous improvement, by women 
taking individual action in their careers,224 by powerful men who support 
                                                 
222 As discussed further above, the improvement noted following the introduction of the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council’s Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
with 2010 amendments was immediate and substantial. Although commencing from a low 
base and despite leaving much work still to complete, the voluntary mechanism has achieved 
a substantial improvement. 
223 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Governance Principles, above n 127, 6. 
224 Sheryl Sandberg, COO of Facebook, is one female leader who has advocated for women to 
‘[take] more control of their careers’: Sheryl Sandberg, Why We Have too Few Women 
Leaders (December 2010) TED <http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/en/sheryl_sandberg 
_why_we_have_too_few_women_leaders.html> (by interview) in Grant Thornton, above 
n 178, 11. In her speech, Sandberg noted that what the data shows, above all else, is ‘that 
success and likeability are positively correlated for men and negatively correlated for 
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women seeking board positions, and by a changing attitude in corporate 
Australia to female participation, board equality is achievable. 
X OVERALL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This article has analysed Australian board diversity, in an international 
context, with particular emphasis upon gender. Although gender represents 
but one element of board diversity, over the past decade it has been the 
subject of substantial international scrutiny, debate and political action, 
making it certainly the most topical. The correlation between board gender 
diversity and enhanced corporate performance is supported by empirical 
research. The authors have pointed out that this correlation is subject to 
numerous counter-arguments; however, there is a very widely held view that 
gender diversity is a matter of good corporate governance even if it is still 
inconclusive whether there is a business case to be made out for including a 
certain percentage of males or females on boards. The board gender debate 
has inspired change, providing a solid foundation upon which the 
international community — corporate and non-corporate — can improve 
performance in all elements of board diversity. 
The change process has evolved through several phases, which were outlined 
in an historical framework. As the debate has progressed, international best 
practice targets have developed, with nations implementing various 
mechanisms, policies and laws to contribute domestically to the amelioration 
of a global issue. These mechanisms possess unique advantages and 
disadvantages, with the practical implementation of each achieving change by 
varying degrees of speed and magnitude. Similarly, each mechanism exposes 
its nation to unique and specific risks — a fact which may be overlooked in 
the rush to improve statistics. 
Norway is the proven international leader, achieving best practice among its 
listed companies by enacting mandatory quota legislation. In response, 
numerous countries have followed Norway's lead by introducing their own 
                                                                                                                    
women’. Whilst not suggesting that women be rude and unlikeable in the workplace, she 
noted the workplace challenges that might explain why a smaller percentage of women than 
men reach the top of their professions. Creating the opportunity and encouraging 
participation, whilst removing barriers to female career development, are essential processes. 
Coupled with a drive from women — a belief that they deserve as much as men any 
promotion, opportunity or progression for which they are equally qualified — will lead to a 
multi-faceted approach that will decrease the imbalance. 
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quota legislation. However, critics of this measure argue that quota legislation 
results in window dressing and presents risks to the integrity and strength of 
corporate governance. Certainly, the ideal scenario is for organisations to 
voluntarily achieve board gender equality, thereby retaining discretion over 
directorship appointments, and avoiding compliance costs and penalties whilst 
committing to a culture of gender equity by choice. However, in the corporate 
world, voluntary mechanisms have achieved slower and less significant 
results. For such mechanisms to be successful, it is essential to push beyond 
the tipping point, within reasonable timeframes, to achieve board gender 
diversity. 
Australian progress towards best practice targets has improved (from a low 
base) since the 2010 introduction of the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council’s amendments to Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations. However, statistics place Australia behind global leaders. 
This article has analysed mechanisms used to improve board gender diversity 
and Australia’s progress towards best practice. Furthermore, an assessment 
has been made of the opportunity that exists for Australia to become the first 
nation to achieve best practice in its corporate sector using a voluntary 
strategy. It is evident that, in doing so, much can be learnt from other nations 
and from the Australian not-for-profit, university and government sectors. 




Table 1: Overview of Development of Board Gender 




Content Outer Content Inner Content 
 1970: Direct action by 
women as individuals 
and organised groups. 
1972: Whitlam Labor 
government elected. 
1970: Germaine Greer’s 
The Female Eunuch 
published. 
 1972: Australian 
Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission 
adopted the principle of 













 1973: First Women’s 
Advisor to the Prime 
Minister, the first such 
position in the world. 
1977: First Victorian 




 Educational direct action 
to provide girls with 
equal educational 
opportunities to boys. 
1981: Federal Human 






   
 1983: Appointment of 
first Equal Opportunity 
Commissioner. 
 
1983, 1987, 1990: 
Hawke Labor 
government elected. 
1987: Affirmative action 
pilot programs in major 
corporations. 
 1987: Persuasion by 
government and industry 
partnerships for piloting 
change programs. 
 
Training programs on 
equal opportunity in the 
workplace 
1983: Federal 
government policy to 
appoint women to 
government boards. 
2001: Women on Boards 
started as an informal 
network, incorporating 
in 2006. 
 1987: Public programs 





2002: Workplace Gender 
Equality Agency Index 
Report. 
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 Content Outer Content Inner Content 
 2007: 40–40–20 rule 
introduced in aggregate: 
federal government 
policy of 40 per cent 
minimum representation 
on boards in aggregate 
across government 
sector. 
1986: Australian Human 










  1993: Keating Labor 
government elected. 
 
  1986: Federal 
Affirmative Action for 
Women Act enacted, 





Female Power and 
Influence 
   
 2007: Political action 
through elections. 
2007: Rudd Labor 
government elected. 






 2010: 40–40–20 rule 
introduced for each 
board: Federal 
government policy to 
have 40 per cent 
minimum representation 
of men and women on 
each government board. 
2010: Gillard Labor 
government elected. 
2010: AICD scholarships 
and mentoring for 
women on boards. 
 
 2012: Workplace Gender 
Equality Act enacted. 
2012: Revision of 
federal Equal 
Opportunity and Sex 
Discrimination Acts. 
2011: Male champions 
of women on boards, led 
by Mike Smith, CEO, 
ANZ Bank. 
 
 2013: Leadership action 
by agencies and 
professional bodies to 
broaden diversity on 
corporate boards. 
 2012: Census of Women 
in Leadership, Equal 
Opportunity for Women 
in the Workplace 
Agency, including data 
on women on corporate 
boards. 
 
 
